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Abstract
Hate speech, offensive language, sexism, racism and other
types of abusive behavior have become a common phe-
nomenon in many online social media platforms. In recent
years, such diverse abusive behaviors have been manifesting
with increased frequency and levels of intensity. This is due
to the openness and willingness of popular media platforms,
such as Twitter and Facebook, to host content of sensitive or
controversial topics. However, these platforms have not ad-
equately addressed the problem of online abusive behavior,
and their responsiveness to the effective detection and block-
ing of such inappropriate behavior remains limited. In fact,
up to now, they have entered an arms race with the perpe-
trators, who constantly change tactics to evade the detection
algorithms deployed by these platforms. Such algorithms are
typically custom-designed and tuned to detect only one spe-
cific type of abusive behavior, but usually miss other related
behaviors.
In the present paper, we study this complex problem by fol-
lowing a more holistic approach, which considers the vari-
ous aspects of abusive behavior. To make the approach tangi-
ble, we focus on Twitter data and analyze user and textual
properties from different angles of abusive posting behav-
ior. We propose a deep learning architecture, which utilizes
a wide variety of available metadata, and combines it with
automatically-extracted hidden patterns within the text of the
tweets, to detect multiple abusive behavioral norms which are
highly inter-related. We apply this unified architecture in a
seamless, transparent fashion to detect different types of abu-
sive behavior (hate speech, sexism vs. racism, bullying, sar-
casm, etc.) without the need for any tuning of the model ar-
chitecture for each task. We test the proposed approach with
multiple datasets addressing different and multiple abusive
behaviors on Twitter. Our results demonstrate that it largely
outperforms the state-of-art methods (between 21 and 45%
improvement in AUC, depending on the dataset).
Introduction
Social media ubiquity has raised concerns about emerg-
ing problematic phenomena such as the intensity of abu-
sive behavior. Unfortunately, this problem is difficult to
deal with since it has many “faces” and exhibits com-
plex interactions among social media users. Such multi-
faceted abusive behavior involves instances of hate speech,
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offensive, sexist and racist language, aggression, cyber-
bullying, harassment, and trolling (Waseem et al. 2017,
Sanchez and Kumar 2011). Each form of abusive behavior
has its own characteristics, and manifests differently, de-
pending on the social media scope, the users participating in
it, the topic’s sensitivity, and the particular platform it takes
place on. Indeed, popular social media platforms like Twit-
ter and Facebook are not immune to abusive behavior, even
though they have devoted substantial resources to deal with
it (Rozsa 2016).
This type of behavior is harmful both socially, reducing
the proclivity and trust of users to the particular online social
media platform, as well as from a business perspective. For
example, concerns about racist and sexist attacks on Twitter
seem to have impacted a potential sale of the company.1 It
is apparent that social media platforms have not adequately
addressed this problem so far. Instead, they iteratively an-
nounce new measures to curve abuse by adapting their de-
tection mechanisms (e.g., Twitter 2 3 ).
The research community has also made attempts at
detecting abusive behavior. For example, there have
been various works attempting to detect hate speech
(Djuric et al. 2015), (Warner and Hirschberg 2012),
(Waseem and Hovy 2016), (Badjatiya et al. 2017), cyber-
bullying (Chatzakou et al. 2017), (Hariani and Riadi 2017),
(Dinakar, Reichart, and Lieberman 2011), and even to ad-
dress all kinds of abusive behavior (Davidson et al. 2017),
(Chen et al. 2012), (Nobata et al. 2016). Furthermore,
various techniques have been applied to detect offensive
language (Xiang et al. 2012), (Clarke and Grieve 2017),
(Mehdad and Tetreault 2016), and even racism and
sexism (Kwok and Wang 2013), (Lozano et al. 2017),
(Jha and Mamidi 2017). However, these solutions are
typically custom built and tuned for a specific platform and
type of abusive behavior, and not generalizable.
Furthermore, abusive behavior cannot be assumed just by
a “monolithic” consideration of the content (e.g., text of an
individual post). Instead, in this work, we follow a more
“holistic” approach to consider other facts such as the users’
prior behavior, their social network, their popularity, their
1Did trolls cost Twitter 3.5bn and its sale? goo.gl/PlIL66
2A Calendar of Our Safety Work (Twitter): https://goo.gl/sX2Apb
3https://twitter.com/jack/status/919028950650589184
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account settings, and even the metadata of posts, to reveal a
more global abusive behavior tendency. We tackle the prob-
lem by designing a novel, unified deep-learning architecture,
able to digest and combine any available attributes, in order
to detect abusive behavior. The deep-learning approach al-
lows us to capture subtle, hidden commonalities and differ-
ences between the various abusive behaviors within the same
model. Our method is a global and lightweight solution, with
the capacity to take into account the plethora of available
(meta)data, to recognize various types of abusive behavior,
and without too much feature engineering and model tuning.
We show that the combination of all available metadata with
the proposed training methodology can substantially outper-
form the state of the art over a variety of datasets, each of
which captures a different facet of abusive behavior: i) cy-
berbullying, ii) offensive, iii) hate, and iv) sarcasm.
More concretely, we make the following contributions:
• We demonstrate the importance of combining all avail-
able (meta)data for detecting abusive behavior. We mea-
sure its importance by experimenting and producing supe-
rior results, with a deep-learning-based architecture able
to combine the available input. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to demonstrate the power of such a
unified architecture in detecting various facets of abuse in
online social networks.
• We show how naive training methodology fails to make
optimal use of heterogeneous inputs. To address this, we
implement a training technique that focuses separately on
each input by alternating training between them. This op-
timization substantially boosts detection capabilities, as it
allows the model to avoid considering only the most dom-
inant features for each task.
• We show that our architecture is portable across different
forms of abusive behavior, as opposed to previous work
which uses customized detectors for each type of abuse.
We experiment on four datasets covering several forms of
abuse, and find that our unified architecture works across
all four without the need for any tuning or reconfigur-
ing. Our results shed light on how different feature types
contribute to abuse detection, and provide evidence that
text-only features alone are insufficient to reliably detect
generic abusive behavior.
• We demonstrate that our methodology can be easily
adapted for the detection of toxic behavior in domains
such as online gaming, without further tuning.
Background and Related Work
Problem. Abuse detection has been an increasingly
trending topic over the past few years. Numerous
studies have been published, trying to address this
problem especially in social networks, and in vari-
ous forms. Hate speech detection (Djuric et al. 2015),
(Warner and Hirschberg 2012), (Waseem and Hovy 2016),
(Badjatiya et al. 2017), cyber-bullying identification
(Chatzakou et al. 2017), (Hariani and Riadi 2017),
(Dinakar, Reichart, and Lieberman 2011), and the detec-
tion of abusive (Chen et al. 2012), (Nobata et al. 2016),
(Davidson et al. 2017), or offensive language
(Xiang et al. 2012), (Clarke and Grieve 2017),
(Mehdad and Tetreault 2016) are some of the facets of
this problem. In fact, some works try to detect more
specific types of hateful behaviour, such as racism
(Kwok and Wang 2013), (Lozano et al. 2017), or sexism
(Jha and Mamidi 2017). However, as (Waseem et al. 2017)
point out, there are many similarities between these sub-
tasks, and scholars tend to group them under “umbrella
terms” - like (Schmidt and Wiegand 2017) do for hate
speech - or use them interchangeably. Yet, major advance-
ments on these tasks are quite new and many of the related
studies are preliminary.
Methods. Most of previous works use traditional
machine learning classifiers, such as logistic regres-
sion (Xiang et al. 2012), (Waseem and Hovy 2016),
(Davidson et al. 2017) and support vector machines
(Warner and Hirschberg 2012), or ensemble classifiers
of such traditional methods (Burnap and Williams 2015).
Some studies experiment with deep learning on this task,
especially after the major advancements of the last years.
Due to the large amount of related research concerning
these tasks, we only analyze works that are most relevant
with ours in terms of domain and methodology, like in
(Badjatiya et al. 2017), (Gamba¨ck and Sikdar 2017), and
(Park and Fung 2017).
In the case of (Badjatiya et al. 2017), they focus on the
problem of hate speech detection, and specifically attempt
to detect racism and sexism, by applying various deep
learning architectures. These architectures include Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNNs), Long Short-Term Memory
Networks (LSTMs), and FastText (Joulin et al. 2016), com-
bined with numerous features like TF-IDF and Bag of Words
(BoW) vectors. Their LSTM classifier with random embed-
dings seems to get significantly improved performance com-
pared to baseline methods.
In (Gamba¨ck and Sikdar 2017) they also use deep learn-
ing models to address hate speech on Twitter. However,
they only experiment with CNNs and some feature em-
beddings, such as one-hot encoded character n-gram vec-
tors and word embeddings. According to their results, they
outperform the baseline in terms of precision and F1-score
but not on recall. Similarly, (Park and Fung 2017) also use
CNNs with character- and word-level inputs for the same
task. However, they investigate two different cases; perform-
ing the classification for all three labels (‘none,’ ‘sexist,’ and
‘racist’) at once, or beginning with the detection of ‘abusive
language’ and then further distinguish between ‘sexist’ or
‘racist.’ Their results show that, in general, the two cases can
have equally good performance. Their deep learning model,
though, does not seem to perform as well as traditional ma-
chine learning algorithms when it comes to the two-step ap-
proach. All previously mentioned works experiment with the
dataset that was published in (Waseem and Hovy 2016) and
we also use it to compare the results.
Literature on the topic of hate detection on Twitter us-
ing deep learning has been sparse. However, there are some
works addressing this problem in different online platforms.
For example, the study in (Nobata et al. 2016) deals with
Yahoo news comments which have been annotated as abu-
sive or not, by trained Yahoo employees. More specifi-
cally, they employ several datasets from comments found
on Yahoo! Finance and News. Most of them were anno-
tated by employees of the company, one was crowdsourced
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and one was provided
from (Djuric et al. 2015). In the work of (Djuric et al. 2015),
they also classify hate speech on Yahoo comments, using
the continuous BOW neural language model to train word
and comment representations into ‘paragraph embeddings’
(named paragraph2vec). They classify between hate and
clean comments using logistic regression.
Nobata et al. (Nobata et al. 2016) compare directly their
research with (Djuric et al. 2015), as their works have many
similarities. Except from working on the same task and do-
main, they also employ similar features, i.e., comment em-
beddings (named comment2vec). However, they treat these
embeddings differently, without using deep learning based
models. Except from the embeddings, they also construct
a number of other features, all derived from the text of
the comment. For the classification task they use the Vow-
pal Wabbit’s regression model,4 which generally works well
with NLP features. According to their results, they outper-
form (Djuric et al. 2015) by 0.10 in AUC and achieve 82.6%
F-score.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, the present
work is the first to study in depth the application of deep
learning on the detection of abuse in all its forms with
a unified architecture. Departing from the previous works
that use mostly textual or custom, task-specific, features,
we design a neural network architecture that is able to di-
gest all available input (both text and numerical metadata).
Furthermore, training the proposed multi-input network is
not straightforward. We introduce an interleaved approach
that has only been adapted from image recommendation sys-
tems (Hidasi et al. 2016). As far as we know, we are the first
to experiment with this architecture on classification of text.
To sum up, our work is the first proposed unified solu-
tion for detecting a diverse set of abusive behaviors on plat-
forms like Twitter. The results of our proposed architecture
improve over all the state-of-the-art methods, and this is the
case across all types of abusive behavior.
Deep Learning Architectures
Our overarching goal is to produce a classifier that can de-
tect nuanced forms of abusive behavior. There is a host of
literature that tackles this problem and uses a variety of ap-
proaches to do so. A key takeaway from the majority of this
work is that building a model based on text is outperformed
by those that additionally take domain specific features into
account. Unfortunately, this is a cumbersome process, with
slightly different problems and data sources requiring spe-
cially constructed models using different architectures. Ide-
ally, we would prefer to have a single model/architecture that
incorporates domain specific metadata, as well as text con-
tent and is performant on a large number of abusive content
4https://github.com/JohnLangford/vowpal wabbit
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Figure 1: The individual classifiers that are the basis of the
combined model. Left: the text-only classifier, right is the
metadata-only classifier.
detection tasks. To that end, we present a unified classifica-
tion model for abusive behavior. Our approach is treating i)
raw text, and ii) domain specific metadata, separately at first,
and later combining them into a single model.
In the remainder of this section, we provide details on
how our final network is built from its component parts, pay-
ing particular attention to the specifics of how to train such
a multi-input model. Firstly, we present the two individual
classifiers that we later fuse: the text and the metadata clas-
sifier. Later, we discuss how we can combine them, as well
as the different ways of training such a multi-path network.
Text Classification Network
This classifier only considers the raw text as input. There
are several choices for the class of neural network to base
our classifier off. We use Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN)
since they have proven successful at understanding se-
quences of words and interpreting their meaning. We exper-
imented with both character- and word-level RNNs, with the
latter to be the most performant across all our datasets.
Text preprocessing: Before feeding any text to the network,
we need to transform each sample to a sequence of words.
As neural networks are trained in mini-batches, every sam-
ple in a batch must have the same sequence length (num-
ber of words). Tweets containing more words than the se-
quence length are trimmed, whereas tweets with less words
are left-padded with zeros (the model learns they carry no in-
formation). Ideally, we want to setup a sequence length that
is large enough to contain most text from the samples, but
avoids outliers as they waste resources (feeding zeros in the
network). Therefore, we take the 95th percentile of length
of tweets (with respect to the number of words) in the in-
put corpus as the optimal sequence length. For tweets, this
results in sequences of 30 words (i.e., 5% of tweets that con-
tain more than 30 words are truncated). Sequences with less
than this length are padded with zeros. We additionally re-
move any words that appear only once in the corpus, as they
are most likely typos and can result in over-fitting. Once pre-
processed, the input text is fed to the network for learning.
Word embedding layer: The first layer of the network per-
forms a word embedding, which maps each word to a high-
dimensional (typically 25 − 300 dimensions) vector. Word
embedding has proved to be a highly effective technique for
text classification tasks, and additionally reduces the num-
ber of training samples required to reach good performance.
We settled on using pre-trained word embeddings from
GloVe (Pennington, Socher, and Manning 2014), which is
constructed on more than 2 billion tweets. We choose the
highest dimension embeddings (200) available, as these pro-
duce the best results across all abusive behaviors investi-
gated. If a word is not found in the GloVe dataset, we initial-
ize a vector of random weights, which the word embedding
layer eventually learns from the input data.
Recurrent layer: The next layer is an RNN with 128
units (neurons). As mentioned previously, RNNs learn se-
quences of words by updating an internal state. After ex-
perimenting with several choices for the RNN architecture
(Gated Recurrent Unit or GRUs, Long Short-Term Mem-
ory or LSTMs, and Bidirectional RNNs), we find that due
to the rather small sequences of length in social media
(typically less than 100 words per post, just 30 for Twit-
ter), simple GRUs are performing as well as more complex
units. To avoid over-fitting we use a recurrent dropout with
p = 0.5 (i.e., individual neurons were available for acti-
vation with probability 0.5), as it empirically provided the
best results across all studied behaviors. Finally, an atten-
tion layer (Bahdanau, Cho, and Bengio 2014) can be added
as it provides a mechanism for the RNN to “focus” on in-
dividual parts of the text that contain information related to
the task. Attention is particularly useful to tackle texts that
contain longer sequences of words (e.g., forum posts). Em-
pirically, we find this only helps for texts that exceed 100
words and, thus, disable it for any classification task that in-
volves tweets.
Classification layer: Finally, we use a fully connected out-
put layer (a.k.a. Dense layer) with one neuron per class we
want to predict, and a softmax activation function to nor-
malize output values between 0 and 1. The output of each
neuron at this stage represents the probability of the sample
belonging to each respective class. Note that this is the layer
that is sliced off when we fuse the text and metadata models
into the final combined classifier.
Metadata Network
The metadata network considers non-sequential data. For
example, on Twitter, it might evaluate the number of
followers, the location, account age, total number of
(posted/favorited/liked) tweets, etc., of a user.
Metadata preprocessing: Before feeding the data into the
neural network, we need to transform any categorical data
into numerical, either via enumeration or one-hot encoding,
depending on the particulars of the input. Then, each sample
is thus represented as a vector of numerical features.
Batch normalization layer: Neural network layers work
best when the input data have zero mean and unit variance,
as it enables faster learning and higher overall accuracy.
Thus, we pass the data through a Batch Normalization layer
that takes care of this transformation at each batch.
Dense layers: We use a simple network of several fully con-
nected (dense) layers to learn the metadata. We design our
network so that a bottleneck is formed. Such a bottleneck
has been shown to result in automatic construction of high-
level features (He et al. 2016, Tishby and Zaslavsky 2015).
In our implementation, we experimented with multiple ar-
chitectures and we ended up using 5 layers of size 512, 245,
128, 64, 32, which provide good results across all studied
behaviors. On top of this layer, we add an additional (6th)
layer which ensures that this network has the same dimen-
sionality as the text-only network; this ends up enhancing
performance when we fuse the two networks. Finally, we
use tanh as activation function, since it works better with
standardized numerical data.
Classification layer: As with the test only network, we use
one neuron per class with softmax activation.
Combining the Two Classification Paths
The two classifiers presented above can handle individually
either the raw text or the metadata. To build a multi-input
classifier we need to combine these two paths. There are two
possible ways to perform such a task: i) just use the output
of the two classifiers (probabilities of belonging to a given
class) as input of a new classifier, or ii) combine the two clas-
sifiers on the previous layer that represents the automatically
constructed features (as shown in Figure 2).
Instead of combining an ensemble of pre-trained classi-
fiers, neural networks allow us to create arbitrary combina-
tions of layers and construct complex architectures that re-
semble graphs. Therefore, instead of training and then com-
bining two separate classifiers, we can design from the be-
ginning a single architecture that combines both paths be-
fore their inputs are squashed into classification probabilities
(Figure 2). Therefore, we concatenate the text and metadata
networks at their penultimate layer: i) the text path where
sequences of raw text are input and 128 activations are pro-
duced (one for each RNN unit) and ii) the metadata path
where each input produces 128 activations. We can think of
this architecture as merging together 128 automatically con-
structed features from each input and then attempting the
final classification task based on this vector.
Contrary to traditional machine learning, this architecture
allows us to mix a diverse set of data (sequences of text and
discrete metadata) without having to explicitly construct the
text features (e.g., TF-IDF vectors). Furthermore, we utilize
the power of word embedding that have been pre-trained on
much larger datasets.
Training the Combined Network
While the combined architecture is straightforward, just
training the whole network at once is not the most optimal
way. In fact, there are several ways to train the combined
network: below, we list some of the possible ways and on
the Evaluation Section we compare their performance.
Training the entire network at once (Naive Training):
The simplest approach is to train the entire network at once;
i.e., to treat it as a single classification network with two in-
puts. However, the performance we achieve from this train-
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Figure 2: The combined classifier. The output of the two in-
dividual paths are concatenated and a classification layer is
added over the merged data.
ing technique is suboptimal: the two paths have different
convergence rates (i.e., one of the paths might converge
faster, and thus dominate any subsequent training epochs).
Furthermore, standard backpropagation across the whole
network can also induce unpredictable interactions as we al-
low the weights to be modified at both paths simultaneously.
Transfer learning: We can avoid this problem by pre-
training the two paths separately and only afterwards join
them together to construct the architecture of Figure 2. This
involves a number of steps:
1. Pre-train separately the text and the metadata classifiers.
2. We remove the classification layer of each classifier, effec-
tively exposing the activations of their penultimate layer.
We treat these as the features that the two pre-trained net-
works have constructed based on their training.
3. We freeze the weights of both networks, so no further re-
training of their weights is possible.
4. We add a concatenation layer and a classification layer,
effectively transforming the separate models of Figure 1
into the architecture of the combined model (Figure 2).
5. We train again the combined model. Only the final layer’s
weights are trainable.
Note: this model resembles an ensemble but with a key
difference: the input is not the final class probabilities
(numclass+numclass features) but features learned by the
previous layer of the pre-trained models (128+128 features).
Transfer learning with fine tuning (FT): This approach is
the same as above, except we do not freeze the weights on
the original networks. The practical result of this is that our
pre-training serves only to initialize the weights, which the
fused network can later adapt when we merge the two paths.
Combined learning with interleaving (Interleaved): As
discussed, standard training of the whole network at once
may lead to poor performance due to the interaction of up-
dating both data paths at once. The training approaches pre-
sented in the previous sections try to mitigate this problem
by training the two paths separately and then concatenating
the two pre-trained models together. Instead, here we intro-
duce a way that allows us to train the full network simul-
taneously while mitigating the aforementioned drawbacks.
In fact, we demonstrate later that this approach achieves the
best results in all four datasets.
To do this, we can design our training in a way that, at
each mini-batch, data flow through the whole network, but
only one of the paths is updated. To do so, we train the
two paths in an alternating fashion. For example, on even-
numbered mini-batches the gradient descent only updates
the text path whereas on odd-numbered batches the metadata
ones. Finally, between epochs we also alternate the paths so
both paths get a chance to observe the whole dataset.
To implement this interleaved approach (e.g., in Keras),
we initialize two identical models A and B with the archi-
tecture shown in Figure 2. However, before compiling the
models, we introduce a single difference: the text-path of
A is defined as non-trainable (‘frozen’) and, similarly, the
metadata-path on B is also ‘frozen.’ During training, at each
mini-batch we alternate these models:
• If (batch number + epoch number) is even, then use
model A (else, use B). Notice, the input will pass through
both paths, however, the gradient will only update the
weights of a single path.
• Copy the newly updated weights to the unused model.
Now both models have equal weights.
• Repeat for next mini-batch.
At the end of this process, we have two identical mod-
els, each trained one-path-at-a-time. Our empirical results
shown that mini-batches of 64 to 512 samples perform simi-
lar on all datasets and we chose 512 as it speeds up training.
This results in a more optimal, balanced network as the
gradient is only able to change one path at a time, thus avoid-
ing unwanted interactions. At the same time, the loss func-
tion is calculated over the whole, combined, network (notice
that the input does pass through the whole network).
The interleaving architecture, originally introduced in
(Hidasi et al. 2016), used parallel training on two recurrent
neural networks for multimedia and textual features, and ap-
plied for video and product recommendations. However, our
work is the first one to introduce it on text classification.
Dataset
In this section, we first describe the features we extract. Then
we analyze the datasets used in the experiments and how
they fit the scope of our analysis. Table 1 summarizes the
basic properties (e.g., number of tweets, involved users) and
the available metadata per dataset.
Feature Extraction
Word Vectors (WV): are representations of words into a
vector space (word2vec). As explained earlier, and using the
GloVe method (Pennington, Socher, and Manning 2014),
the words from tweets are mapped, or embedded, into a
high-dimensional vector of 200 dimensions.
Dataset Tweets Classes Users WV TF UF NF
Cyberbullying 6091
8.5% Bully
891 X X X X5.5% Aggressive
86% Normal
Offensive 16059
12% Racism
1236 X X X20% Sexism
68% None
Hate 24783
6% Hate
X X77% Offensive
17% Neither
Sarcasm 61075 10.5% Sarcastic 60255 X X X89.5% Normal
Table 1: A descriptive analysis of the datasets with informa-
tion about the number of tweets and users, the distribution
of the classes and whether or not we have the correspondent
word vector (WV), tweet- (TF), user- (UF) and network-
based (NF) metadata.
Metadata Features: Similar to the work presented
in (Chatzakou et al. 2017) a set of metadata is considered,
either tweet-, user-, or network-based, since they have been
proven effective for a similar task. More specifically, these
metadata are of three general categories:
Tweet-based (TF): some common and basic textual data are
considered, frequently used on Twitter; namely the amount
of hashtags and mentions of other users; how many emoti-
cons exist in the tweet; how many words there are with up-
percase letters only; the amount of URLs included. More-
over, tweets’ sentiment (i.e., positive/negative score), spe-
cific emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and
surprise), and offensiveness scores are considered.
User-based (UF): for the author level, we extract a few basic
metadata regarding his popularity (i.e., number of follow-
ers/friends). Also, we consider his activity on Twitter based
on the number of posted and favorited tweets, the subscribed
lists, and the age of his account.
Network-based (NF): we analyze a user’s network by con-
sidering his followers (i.e., someone who follows a user) and
friends (i.e., someone who is followed by a user). Based on
(Chatzakou et al. 2017), the considered metadata indicate a
user’ popularity (i.e., the number of followers and friends,
and the ratio of such measures), the extent to which a user
tends to reciprocate the follower connections he receives, the
power difference between a user and his mentions, the user’s
position in his network (i.e., hub, authority, eigenvector and
closeness centrality), as well as a user’s tendency to cluster
with others (i.e., clustering coefficient).
Cyberbullying Dataset
The first dataset is provided by (Chatzakou et al. 2017) and
was collected for the purpose of detecting two instances
of abusive behavior on Twitter: cyberbullying and cyber-
aggression. In addition to a baseline, the authors collected a
set of tweets between June and August 2016, using snow-
ball sampling around the GamerGate controversy, which
is known to have produced many instances of cyberbully-
ing and cyber-aggression. The 9, 484 tweets were grouped
into 1, 303 per user “batches” and labeled via crowdsourced
workers into one of four categories: 1) bullying, 2) ag-
gressive, 3) spam, or 4) normal. The authors are careful
to differentiate between aggressive and bullying behavior.
An aggressor was defined as “someone who posts at least
one tweet or retweet with negative meaning, with the in-
tent to harm or insult other users” and a bully was de-
fined as “someone who posts multiple tweets or retweets
with negative meaning for the same topic and in a repeated
fashion, with the intent to harm or insult other users.” The
aggressive and bullying labels make up about 8% of the
dataset, spam makes up about 1/3, with the remainder nor-
mal. For our purposes, we remove the batches labeled as
spam, as they can be handled with more specialized tech-
niques (Chatzakou et al. 2017). We note that the authors
were focused on identifying bullying and aggressive users,
but we are interested in classifying individual tweets and
thus, we break up each batch into individual tweets, each
labeled with whatever label their batch was given. In addi-
tion to the vector representations (WV), this dataset includes
all types of metadata that we use in the metadata classifier,
as previously described (i.e., TF, UF, and NF).
Offensive Dataset
The second dataset, provided by (Waseem and Hovy 2016),
is focused on racism and sexism. Collected over a two-
month period, the authors manually searched for common
hateful terms targeting groups, e.g., ethnicity, sexual ori-
entation, gender, religion, etc. The search results were nar-
rowed down to a set of users that seemed to espouse a lot of
racist and sexist views. After collection, the data were pre-
processed to remove Twitter specific content (e.g., retweets
and mentions), punctuation, and all stop words except “not.”
The tweets were labeled as racist or sexist according
to a set of criteria: 1) if the tweet attacks, criticizes,
or seeks to silence a minority, 2) if it promotes hate
speech or violence, or 3) if there is use of sexist or racial
slurs. Data were manually annotated (not via crowdsourc-
ing) and resulted in 2k racist and 3k sexist tweets, out
of 16k total. This dataset is a good benchmark for the
present work as it has been used by several similar stud-
ies, e.g., (Badjatiya et al. 2017, Gamba¨ck and Sikdar 2017,
Park and Fung 2017). When working with this dataset, ex-
cept from the word vectors (WV), we also employ both TF
and UF metadata. However, we do not use network-related
metadata (NF), due to time limitations (it takes a significant
amount of computation and network effort to crawl Twitter
users’ profiles with nowadays’ Twitter API rate limits).
Hate Dataset
Tweets characterized as hateful, offensive, or neither are pro-
vided by (Davidson et al. 2017). Here, hate speech is de-
fined as language that is used to express hatred, insult, or
to humiliate a targeted group or its members. Offensive lan-
guage is less clearly defined as speech that uses offensive
words, but does not necessarily have offensive meaning.
Thus, this dataset makes the distinction that offensive lan-
guage can be used in context that is not necessarily hate-
ful. Of 80 million tweets they collected, a 25k were la-
beled by crowdsourced workers, with a resulting intercoder-
agreement score of 92%. 77% of the tweets were labeled
as offensive, with only 6% labeled as hateful. The authors
only made the text of the tweets available, and so we have
no metadata to use in our evaluation, other than WV.
Sarcasm Dataset
In the dataset by (Rajadesingan, Zafarani, and Liu 2015),
tweets are characterized as sarcastic or non-sarcastic. Sar-
casm, in this work, is defined as ‘a way of using words that
are the opposite of what you mean in order to be unpleasant
to somebody or to make fun of them.’ In some online settings
such as Twitter or Facebook, with not enough context on the
topic of discussion or interest to be civil, sarcasm can be
considered impolite and even aggressive behavior. Though
this dataset is slightly different from the rest, considering
the task at hand, we believe it can bring a useful dimension
to the plurality and complexity of abusive behavior, and can
inform our methodology on detecting such language.
The data collection was conducted based on self-
described users’ annotations. Specifically, the authors col-
lected only tweets that contained the hashtags #sarcasm and
#not. Then, they filtered out tweets that did not contain the
aforementioned hashtags at the end of them, in order to
eliminate tweets that referred to sarcasm but they were not
sarcastic. Moreover, they removed the non-english tweets,
retweets, tweets with less than three words, as well as tweets
that contained mentions or URLs (due to computational
complexity). The final dataset consists of almost 91k tweets,
where 10% are sarcastic. Since not all data were still pub-
licly available through Twitter API, we ended up with 60k -
preserving the portion of sarcastic tweets. Finally, during the
classification, we removed the #sarcasm and #not hashtags.
Similarly with the Offensive dataset, here also we employ
WV, TF and UF attributes, but no NF. For our experiments,
we use the original highly imbalanced dataset (even though
the authors report attempts of data balancing in order to im-
prove the classification performance) since it adapts better
to real cases. Hence, we compare our classification perfor-
mance with the imbalanced results of the baseline.
Evaluation
In this section, we describe in detail our experimental setup
and results while testing the performance of our method on
the different datasets used. All results shown here are based
on 10-fold cross validation.
Experimental Setup
For our implementation we use Keras5 with Theano6 as
back-end for the deep learning models implementation. We
use the functional API to implement our multi-input single-
output model. Finally, we run the experiments on a server
that is equipped with three Tesla K40c GPUs.
In terms of training, we use categorical cross-entropy as
loss function and Adam as the optimization function. A max-
imum of 100 epochs is allowed, but we also employ a sepa-
5https://keras.io/
6http://deeplearning.net/software/theano/
rate validation set to perform early stopping: training is in-
terrupted if the validation loss did not drop in 10 consecutive
epochs and the weights of the best epoch are restored.
It is important to notice that the same model (with the
same architecture, number of layers, number of units and
parameters) is used for all datasets, as we want to demon-
strate the performance of this architecture across different
tasks. The performance of the algorithm might increase even
further if the parameters are tuned specifically for each task
(e.g., using a larger network when there are more training
samples). Overall, the model, excluding the pre-trained word
embeddings, contains approximately 250,000 trainable pa-
rameters (i.e., weights).
Finally, except from each dataset’s state-of-the-art, we
also compare our results with a basic Naive Bayes model,
using the TF-IDF weights for each tweet. For this baseline,
we only use the raw text. First, we perform some basic pre-
processing of the data; we convert all characters to lower-
case and remove all stop words for 14 frequently spoken
languages, as well as some twitter-specific stop words. Fi-
nally, we tokenize the tweet based on some Twitter-specific
markers (hashtags, URLs, and mentions) and punctuation.
Afterwards, we experiment with both Porter and Snowball
stemmers, lemmatization, keeping the most frequent words
and the combinations of all the previously mentioned. We
find that the most efficient step is keeping only the most
frequent words. We also experiment on the amount of fre-
quent words we need to keep and find that the best results
are yielded using the top 10k words.
Experimental Results
In this section we present the classification performance of
the proposed methodology on the four datasets. Next, we ex-
amine which are the inputs that contribute the most. Finally,
we discuss about how the different training strategies affect
the classification performance.
Training methodology: We apply the same model over all
4 datasets and the results of AUC, Accuracy, Precision, Re-
call, and F1-score are summarized in Table 2. Here, we test
the training methods discussed earlier to choose the best
method to compare with the state-of-art. Firstly, we observe
that training with the whole network at once (naive training)
results to suboptimal performance (e.g., AUC of 0.94 in the
cyberbullying dataset). The reason is that allowing the gra-
dient descent to update both paths simultaneously might re-
sult in unwanted interactions between the two. For example,
one path might converge faster than the other, dominating
in the decisions. In fact, when we examine the standalone
classifiers, we observe that the text classifier requires 25-
40 epochs to converge whereas the metadata classifier only
requires 7-12. By training the whole network together, the
metadata side can start overfitting.
A step towards the right direction is to train each path sep-
arately, as individual classifiers, and then transfer the con-
structed features to a new classifier (transfer learning). This
methodology slightly improves the results as it reduces the
interactions between the two paths. Notice that, due to the
fact that most of the network has been already trained, the
additional layer converges after just 3-5 epochs.
AUC Acc. Prec. Rec. F1
Cyberbullying Dataset (3 classes)
DL-Baseline Naive Bayes 0.73 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Chatzakou et al. 2017 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.91
DL-Metadata only 0.93 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.89
DL-Text only 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.89
DL-Text & Metadata (Naive Train.) 0.94 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear.) 0.95 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.90
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear. FT) 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91
DL-Text & Metadata (Interleaved) 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.93
Offensive Dataset
Baseline Naive Bayes 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81
Waseem and Hovy 2016 - - 0.74 0.73 0.78
DL-Metadata only 0.91 0.74 0.81 0.74 0.76
DL-Text only 0.93 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.83
DL-Text & Metadata (Naive Train.) 0.93 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear.) 0.95 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.85
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear. FT) 0.95 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.86
DL-Text & Metadata (Interleaved) 0.96 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87
Hate Dataset
Baseline Naive Bayes 0.71 0.87 0.84 0.87 0.85
Davidson et al. 2017 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.9 0.9
DL-Metadata only 0.75 0.61 0.80 0.61 0.66
DL-Text only 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.88
DL-Text & Metadata (Naive Train.) 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.88
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear.) 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.88
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear. FT) 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.88
DL-Text & Metadata (Interleaved) 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89
Sarcasm Dataset
Baseline Naive Bayes 0.66 0.90 0.89 0.9 0.89
Rajadesingan, Zafarani, and Liu 2015 0.7 0.93 - - -
DL-Metadata only 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.92
DL-Text only 0.81 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
DL-Text & Metadata (Naive Train.) 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear.) 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
DL-Text & Metadata (Tran. Lear. FT) 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
DL-Text & Metadata (Interleaved) 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97
Table 2: Final results of the baselines and our experiments,
for each one of the datasets.
Finally, by employing alternate training (interleaved), we
further improve the predictive power of the resulting model
reaching 0.96 AUC in the cyberbullying. This shows that
multi-input models such as this can benefit from alternate
training. The reason is that this methodology avoids any in-
teractions that might result when weights are updated simul-
taneously in both paths.
Classification performance: Across all datasets and abu-
sive behaviors, the proposed classifier (Interleaved) outper-
forms both the baseline and the state-of-art, as reported in
recent publications. This happens for two reasons. First, the
proposed approach that combines the raw text and the meta-
data achieves notably higher performance when compared
to the ones using a single set of attributes, as it takes ad-
vantage of the additional information from the users’ profile
and network. This is consistent across all four datasets. Sec-
ond, the word embeddings allow us to transfer features that
were constructed over a billion of tweets, and it enables us to
model complex tasks with fewer samples (such as this one).
Looking at the four datasets, on the cyberbullying dataset
we observe that using a single set of attributes (text or meta-
data) we achieve better AUC (0.92 or 0.93, respectively)
but worse accuracy (0.89 or 0.88, respectively) than the
method proposed in the state-of-the-art (AUC 0.91, accu-
racy 0.91) (Chatzakou et al. 2017). However, the interleaved
training of our model substantially outperforms the baseline
(AUC 0.96, accuracy 0.92). Having said that, we need to
mention here that the comparison with this dataset is not di-
rect. The results reported on (Chatzakou et al. 2017) are on
user-level, while ours are on tweet-level. Therefore, while
we can get an understanding on how well their data can be
classified with our algorithm, we cannot parallelize the two
cases. Nevertheless, the results we achieve on tweet-level are
very high, which shows that our model distinguishes very
well between the classes, regardless of the comparison.
On the offensive and sarcasm datasets, we largely outper-
form the previous results, as these works did not consider
metadata. For example, in sarcasm we reach an AUC of
0.98 compared to 0.7 of the existing methodology, as in this
case the text is not carrying significant information to de-
tect if a tweet is sarcastic. However, the remaining metadata
(user, network, sentiment, tweet-level metadata) do reveal
such information. In the case of offensive dataset, there was
no AUC reported in the original publication, but the combi-
nation of text and metadata reached a precision and recall of
0.87-0.88, when compared to 0.73-0.74 of the baseline.
Finally, in the hate dataset the interleaved model is able to
reach an AUC of 0.92. It is the only case where the pre-
cision and recall is similar to baseline, the one presented
in (Davidson et al. 2017), but our AUC and accuracy scores
still outperform this baseline. This is due to the fact that we
could not find any user or network metadata related to this
dataset and, therefore, our classifier is only using the raw
text and the tweet-based metadata.
Metadata importance: As described earlier, we use a num-
ber of metadata features extracted from the tweets and
their authors, namely tweet-based, user-based, and network-
based. These metadata play an important role on the im-
provement of the performance. When combined with the
raw text, they substantially increase all the metrics. How-
ever, not all of them have the same impact on the perfor-
mance (some are more essential than others). In order to de-
termine how each one of these metadata affects our model,
we experiment with the cyberbullying dataset and calculate
their importance. The results on the AUC are presented in
Table 3. We chose this dataset as we have all groups of meta-
data available (user, tweet, network, text) and, therefore, it
is possible to examine how each of them contributes to the
model. The results for other datasets are following similar
trends and are omitted due to space limitations.
Firstly, by examining individual metadata, we observe
that models which are built with individual metadata re-
sult in the poorest performance. For example, network-
level metadata are the least descriptive (AUC of just 0.64)
whereas tweet- and user-based are slightly better (AUC 0.8).
By far, raw text is the best feature for this task, as it can lead
to a model with particularly higher AUC of 0.91.
Furthermore, combining two or more metadata classes
together (user, network, tweet) does increase performance.
This indicates that the information provided is not overlap-
Metadata Features Acronym AUC
Network Only NF 0.641
Tweet Only TF 0.799
User Only UF 0.806
User & Tweet UF+TF 0.887
Network & Tweet NF+TF 0.908
Text Only WV 0.915
User & Network UF+NF 0.915
All-metadata Only TF+UF+NF 0.923
Text & Tweet WV+TF 0.930
Text & Network WV+NF 0.931
Text & User & Tweet WV+UF+TF 0.933
Text & Network & Tweet WV+NF+TF 0.936
Text & User WV+UF 0.938
Text & User & Network WV+UF+NF 0.955
All WV+TF+UF+NF 0.961
Table 3: Metadata Importance. The values are obtained using
the Cyberbullying dataset.
ping and it all adds to better performance. When all the
metadata are combined, we reach an AUC of 0.923 which
is higher than any other metadata combination. Moreover,
using all metadata does result in better classification when
compared to just using the text, showing that these metadata
carry at least as much predictive power as text does.
Nevertheless, the strongest models were built when text
is combined with metadata showing how much the raw text
contributes in this classification task. For example, just com-
bining text with user-level metadata is enough to reach an
impressive performance (0.94 AUC). Adding network data
bumps the performance to 0.955.
Finally, the best performance is reached when all at-
tributes are used. This also demonstrates the fact that the
metadata information does not overlap the information that
can be extracted from raw text, and this is why the proposed
model can be quite powerful and outperforms the state-of-art
models for these tasks.
Generalizing to Other Platforms: Toxic
Behavior in Online Gaming
Though in this work we primarily focus on Twitter to
demonstrate how our unified approach works with the same
set of features, the same methodology can be applied to other
domains with no modifications. To demonstrate this, we run
the same architecture over a dataset from a completely dif-
ferent domain. We acquired the dataset from the authors
of (Blackburn and Kwak 2014) who built a classifier to de-
tect toxic behavior in an online video game. Their dataset
is collected from a crowdsourced system that presents re-
viewers with instances of millions of matches, where toxic
behavior is potentially exhibited. The match data include a
variety of details such as the full in-game chat logs, players’
in-game performance, the most common reason the match
was reported for, the outcome of the match, etc. Matches are
labeled for either pardon or punish by a jury of other players
who cast votes in either direction.
From the 1 million individual matches provided to us, we
extracted a set of features. Like the datasets used earlier in
this work, we extract the chat logs of each potentially offend-
ing player. We also extract a set of domain specific metadata
features (e.g., features that describe the offenders’ perfor-
mance, as well as the performance of other players, the out-
come of the game, how many reports the match received, the
most common report type, etc.). Each match is also labeled
with the final decision of the crowdsourced worker (either,
pardon or punish).
Even though, at a high level, this dataset is structured sim-
ilarly to the 4 datasets presented earlier (i.e., it is divided into
text based and domain specific categories), there are impor-
tant differences. First, the text is much larger (on average
offenders use 2,500 words per match compared to just 30
words per tweet). Next, the domain specific nature of the
metadata does not really have an analogue in the Twitter
datasets we used. Finally, the language used in the chat logs
themselves, while English, is littered with domain specific
jargon. Thus, applying our architecture to this dataset makes
a strong case for its portability to different domains.
In (Blackburn and Kwak 2014), the authors evaluated
several sub-tasks, with varying degrees of difficulty. The first
was the general problem of predicting whether a player will
be pardoned or punished, where their best model had an
AUC of 0.80. They also experimented with trying to pre-
dict only overwhelming decisions, an easier problem, and
achieve AUCs of 0.88 and 0.75 for overwhelming pardon
and punish decisions, respectively.
We tackled the more general problem by running the
dataset through the model presented in our Architecture
Section. We enabled an attention layer to deal with the
length of the text, however, no other changes were made
to the architecture. While we expected reasonable perfor-
mance, we achieved an accuracy of 0.93 and an AUC of
0.89, beating the performance of even the easiest task pre-
sented in (Blackburn and Kwak 2014). These results pro-
vide a strong indication that our architecture is suitable for
finding abusive behavior in a wide variety of domains.
Summary
Unified deep learning classifier is possible: In this work,
we built and applied the exact same deep learning model ar-
chitecture in all four datasets and demonstrated that it can
efficiently handle each type of abusive behavior. While fine-
tuning the classifier parameters for each dataset can squeeze
some more performance, the proposed methodology does
beat the current state of art in each behavior detection.
All inputs help: We demonstrated how each of the attributes
(text, user, network, tweet) contribute in each task, i.e., iden-
tification of specific type of abusive behavior. Our proposed
architecture can seamlessly combine this input into a single
classification model, without particular tuning.
Training methodology: Training a multi-input network is
not straightforward. We introduced a methodology that alter-
nates training between the two input paths to further increase
performance in all datasets tested. We compared the pro-
posed training paradigm with various other possible training
methodologies (ensemble, feature transfer, concurrent train-
ing) and show that it can substantially outperform them.
Flexible to other data: In this paper, we show the ability of
our approach to combine two different paths: text and meta-
data. However, one can simply concatenate more input paths
to the architecture. For example, in an image classification
problem, a CNN-based network can be used to extract image
features and it could be joined with text information (tags
and user comments) and image metadata (time and location
taken, how many pictures the user has taken, the uploader’s
social network, etc.). Similarly, in an audio classification
task, an audio path can be merged with text and metadata.
We leave this exploration as future work.
Generalizing to other platforms: Finally, we showed that
our proposed architecture can be easily applied, in a plug-
and-play fashion, to detect abusive behavior in other online
domains beyond Twitter. As an example, we presented re-
sults on detecting toxic behavior in an online gaming net-
work, with superior performance over the state of art. We
leave further explorations as future work.
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